Constitutional reform: international observers

International elections observation, which was largely unknown before the 1960s, has grown into such a substantial international norm that it would be impossible for small countries, particularly ones with a controversial electoral history such as Guyana, to avoid their participation in their elections process.  It has grown largely in response to the increasing benefits that accrue to those recognised as being a part of the liberal democratic tradition (http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets /miscellaneous_files/wgape/6_Hyde.pdf). The evidence indicates that states inviting observers receive twice as much foreign assistance than states that do not and it is now commonplace for such aid usually to be tied to terms having to do with good governance and democracy.

In 1857, the European powers sent observers to witness the referendum that would unite Moldavia and Wallachia as Romania and this practice was again used when Costa Rica invited the Organization of American States to observe its 1962 elections. However, foreign observation of elections only began to flourish in the wave of democratization that followed the end of the Cold War. It rose from about 10% of all elections during this period to 80% in 2006. ‘In many ways, this represents the Holy Grail for the leaders of counterfeit democracies: it diffuses criticism emanating from domestic groups and ensures that electoral controversy will not lead to the taps of international financial assistance being turned off’ (Cheeseman, Nicholas (2018) How to Rig an Election. Yale University Press).

Although its electoral system is said to be unfair, Malaysia has been one of the few countries that have been able to resist inviting foreign election observers.  It is  criticised for not having an independent election commission; the biased treatment of opposition parties by the commission; gerrymandering; having repressive electoral laws; the huge disparity in election spending between the incumbent party and others; regime control over the media; the use of  incomplete and outdated electoral  lists, etc. Yet of the 14 elections that were held between 1955 and 2018, foreign observers were invited for the first and last time for the 1990 elections. Some of the factors that have made Malaysia impermeable to international pressure to invite observers are said to be its importance to the USA, which has resulted in the latter taking a strategic rather than a confrontational position towards the country; the difficulty of finding appropriate strategies to deal with semi-authoritarian regimes that portray themselves as pillars of stability; its relatively strong tradition of non-interference and being anti-Western and the fact that despite using a variety of manipulative strategies the governing party has never relied on any direct manipulation to win elections (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1868103420930022).

It is generally recognised that the presence of international observers can result in improvements in the electoral process and regime legitimacy but there is said to be a growing number of ‘biased observations’ intended to mislead the public regarding the importance of given election processes and/or the legitimacy of election results (file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/EPDE_ Biased%20observation%20threat%20integrity_EN.pdf).   ‘[The effect] of international election monitoring is well summarised by the title of classic the 1966 Italian Western film, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. The good part is that monitors can improve quality election. The bad part is that most of the time they do not. The ugly part is that they are sometimes biased and contribute to the false legitimisations of governments (Ibid). 

In ‘How to stop elections rigging’ (Future Notes, SN: 31/07/2019) I pointed to the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan as an example of the ugly aspect of foreign intervention. That election was manipulated by the regime of President Ilham Aliyev but was whitewashed by international election observers, including those from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the United States congressional monitoring delegation. It is now more widely accepted that the latest elections in 2018 fell well short of democratic standards.  However, ‘Azerbaijan lies squarely in the energy-rich Caspian region and is therefore the linchpin of Europe’s future oil and gas supplies. That makes it strategically important to the United States, too, because Azerbaijan acts as a counterweight to Europe’s increasing dependence on Russian energy resources’ (Ibid).

The General Elections (Observers) Act 1990 formally governs the invitation and basic roles and activities of foreign elections observers in Guyana. But given the controversy associated with international observers during the 2020 general and regional elections and recent developments in the field, perhaps the process should be placed upon more explicit theoretical and legal bases:  stipulating conditions for inviting and allowing foreign observers and stating in more detail what is expected of them.

Of some relevance to Guyana, the United Nations Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation 2005 recommends that international observers should conduct long-term observations that involve studying the political context of a monitored state; election administration; voter registration; candidate nomination processes; election campaigning; media coverage; human rights interests; the ability of civil society organisations to act as domestic observers; complaints and appeals processes; the voting day; the results, and any post-election disputes. To this may be added that states or groups invited to observe elections must represent good democratic practices, not have a history of involvement in regime change and address the relationship between international and local observers, possibly making the former subordinate to the latter. 

Malawi’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act 1993 is much more comprehensive and in keeping with international best practices in defining the rights and obligations, roles and activities of international observers. For example, the Guyana law gives the president the authority to invite foreign observers while in Malawi that power rests with the elections commission. The Act makes clear that observers are expected to exercise their role with impartiality, independence and objectivity, to respect the constitution and not to interfere in or to impede the normal course of the election. Since Malawi’s constitution gives to the commission the authority ‘to determine electoral petitions and complaints related to the conduct of any elections’ that are then appealable to the High Court, one of the functions of international observation is ‘to verify and monitor the impartiality and legality of the decisions taken by the commission and its officers in settling disputes.’

henryjeffrey@yahoo.com